[Scape]

Here is the TSB report

$1:

The vessel was crewed by a live-aboard crew with two two-week watches, A and B. The A watch had brought the vessel out of its recent four-month refit in Richmond, British Columbia, and handed over to the B watch on 15 March 2006. At 1700 Pacific standard time4 on 21 March 2006, the Queen of the North arrived from Skidegate, British Columbia, at the BC Ferries terminal at Prince Rupert, British Columbia. After unloading passengers and vehicles, the crew prepared the vessel for departure to Port Hardy, British Columbia.


The crew commenced loading vehicles and embarking passengers and, at 2000, the Queen of the North departed for Port Hardy with a crew of 42 and 59 passengers. Scheduled arrival time was 1330 the following day, March 22.

The bridge team on departure comprised the master, the second officer (2/O), the quartermaster5 (QM1), and an additional QM. The additional QM was on the bridge to support QM1, who had requested assistance due to unfamiliarity with the steering system. The fourth officer (4/O) joined them after completing his vessel-departure duties. QM1 was hand-steering the ferry from the aft steering station in the wheelhouse,6 while the ferry was on "standby"7 and proceeding in a southerly direction. QM1's duties included being a lookout, but not while steering the vessel. As it neared Ridley Island, the vessel was taken off standby but remained on hand steering.


At about 2050, QM1 was relieved by QM2 and at approximately 2100 the master handed the con of the ferry to the 2/O and wrote out his night orders. The 2/O was also instructed to call the master if there was traffic at Stella Creek.8 The master then retired to his cabin. The weather was clear with good visibility and light winds.

Between 2200 and 2350, QM3 and QM4 rotated watches as did the 2/O and 4/O. The 2/O had the conduct of the vessel. At some point during this period, the 4/O went below to the crew's mess to eat lunch. QM1 returned to relieve QM2 at approximately 2345 and took over the helm at 2350. The vessel was on autopilot, with steering controls at the forward steering station. The ferry was on a course of about 139º true (T) through Grenville Channel, maintaining a speed made good of about 17.5 knots with engines under bridge control (see Appendix A for the vessel's track).

Before midnight, when the 4/O returned to the bridge, the 2/O informed him that there was no reported traffic but that there was a southbound vessel ahead. This vessel, later identified as the fishing vessel Lone Star, was about 4.4 nautical miles (nm) fine on the port bow, southbound, at a speed of 5.9 knots. The 4/O - now the officer of the watch (OOW) - was also informed that the wind was gusting to 30 knots on the ferry's starboard bow. The 2/O then retrieved a laptop computer from his cabin to play music and, after leaving it on the bridge, proceeded on his break. A personal conversation ensued between the 4/O and QM1, who were now alone on the bridge. At 2359, a course adjustment of 4º to port was made to keep the vessel on track.


The 4/O used the electronic chart system (ECS)10 to determine his estimated time of arrival at the next calling-in point and then used a dimmer knob to turn down the brightness on the ECS monitor to prevent the screen's light from interfering with the visual lookout. At 0002:34, approximately 1.3 nm in advance of a planned course alteration to 118º T, the 4/O reported the ferry approaching Sainty Point to Prince Rupert Traffic. The call took about 40 seconds and music could be heard on the bridge at this time. The 4/O subsequently logged his communication then resumed a personal conversation with QM1.

At about this time, the Queen of the North encountered a squall of heavy winds, rain, and reduced visibility. The Lone Star, meanwhile, having already passed Sainty Point and now rounding Waterman Point, proceeded east to seek shelter from the weather behind Promise Island. At 0005, the Lone Star was 2.8 nm away and bearing 22º on the port bow. It was then no longer visible on the radar screen, and the target-lost alarm was displayed and acknowledged. No attempt was made to communicate with the vessel.

At 0007, the vessel, without making the required course alteration, proceeded past Sainty Point and into Wright Sound. At a speed of 17.5 knots, the next course-alteration point on the planned route would have been 27 minutes ahead, off Point Cumming light.


As the vessel proceeded in Wright Sound, the 4/O and QM1 sat in their chairs next to the radar and forward steering station, respectively, and conversed intermittently for the next 12 minutes while music was being played in the background. Shortly after the Lone Star had rounded Waterman Point and proceeded north toward Brodie Point, the squall passed and visibility improved.

At about 0020, with the vessel now 13 minutes past the planned course-alteration point at Sainty Point, the 4/O moved between the bridge's front window and the radar, and subsequently ordered a course change to 109º, which QM1 queried and he reaffirmed. As QM1 stood to make the change, she looked up and saw trees off the starboard bow. The 4/O also saw trees and moved to the aft steering station. As he did so, he ordered QM1 to switch from autopilot to hand-steering. QM1, however, was unfamiliar with the operation of the switch at the forward steering station and did not know how to comply.

The investigation was unable to ascertain whether QM1 initiated the ordered course change using the autopilot, or if steering was switched to hand-steering by the 4/O, or both. However, data from the ECS indicate that at 0020:50 the vessel's course over ground (COG) began to alter to port, subsequently striking Gil Island at 0021:20 in position 53º19.2' N, 129º14.3' W.


QM1 left the bridge to get the master. The ferry continued to travel forward for a short time, but at a reducing speed as it struck along the island, and then drifted off in a northerly direction.

There is no information to suggest that, up to the time of the striking, navigational equipment or machinery malfunctioned during the voyage.

In late April 2007, BC Ferries forwarded new information to the TSB that suggested that QM1 may have been alone at the time of the grounding.

The TSB thoroughly investigated this new information and the suggestion that QM1 was alone on the bridge at the time of the accident. This included conducting additional interviews, taking into account conflicting statements, and undertaking extensive analysis.

Show me were in that report the Human Rights commision had a hand in the vessel being off course for 15 minutes.

[Freakinoldguy]

QBall QBall:

That's the bridge manning on the heavy's (CPF, 280, tanker). 1 in 4 in open ocean sailing you could, with CO's permission, secure the starboard lookout and have throttle double as lookout.

I realise that you could stand down one watch keeper in open ocean, but in enclosed waters we actually closed up a cable party to go with the bridge watch. It was a modified SSD watch and if required had the emergency steering position manned.

OOD (Officer of the Day) is for alongside. OOW (Officer of the Watch) is at sea. As long as the 2OOW is qualified to take charge of the ship at sea (BWK qualified) then there's no reason why the OOW couldn't pass charge temporarily to 2OOW (assuming there's nothing going on) and hit the heads off the bridge flats on the CPF. Done it numerous times. although I would usually send the 2OOW to go get food/drinks (bridge crew always appreciated a Coke at night to help stay awake). Of course if the 2OOW isn't qualified then you're peeing off the bridge wings (4 hours is a loooooooong time when you gotta pee).

My apologies, OOD was a typo, maybe i've been ashore to long since I retired.

This isn't rocket science, SSO's requires that at least one qualified BWK be on the bridge at all times, when the vessel is underway. Years ago in 4 Squadron, when we sailed without Mars IV's they used the CBM, Mars II Training PO and the other PO2 Bosn as the second officers of the watch, since all recieved navigation training through their trades courses, but in no way shape or form did they qualify as a BWK ticket and ultimately it was the OOW who would have hung had anything gone wrong.

What happens now when you don't have enough qualified Mars Officers to have and OOW and second OOW? Does the OOW have to get someone out of his rack to standby while he takes a whiz? I know this happened alot in training squadron and they had a system of getting up the longest off watch to relieve the OOW if he had to go below for anything.

Like I said before, does BC Ferries have this type of policy and was it disregarded by the third mate or was it ships policy to go below and have a bite to eat leaving two unqualified personnel on watch?

In the case of the helmsman what are they actually responsible for. If it's navigation then hang them, if not then, BC Ferries, the Captain and the Third Mate should be taken to task to find out how this happened and why two unqualified personnel were left alone on the bridge.

[llama66]

Scape Scape:

Never the less the Captain still has to sign off on the recommendations of the HR dept. They can also say they only need 2 people on the bridge at one time but they still have to conform to transport Canada standards Bart. Your little war on PR be dammed, there is still laws and safety regulations. The buck stops at the captains chair.

http://Www.tsb.gc.ca

It's always the Masters fault regardless.

[Freakinoldguy]

llama66 llama66:

Scape Scape:

Never the less the Captain still has to sign off on the recommendations of the HR dept. They can also say they only need 2 people on the bridge at one time but they still have to conform to transport Canada standards Bart. Your little war on PR be dammed, there is still laws and safety regulations. The buck stops at the captains chair.

http://Www.tsb.gc.ca

It's always the Masters fault regardless.

True enough, but I think if he's at fault, BC Ferries is gonna take alot of heat for putting their trust in him.

[ShepherdsDog]

we always rotated positions during the watches. We had a 1 in 3 watch, so you had 5 stations. Port and starboard lookout, bosn's mate, helmsman, and an aft look out back by the ensign staff(where I learned to sleep standing up) - watching for anybody who fell off, or the dummy they tossed off for rescue watch exercises. Then there was one vap watch I pulled in my first month on board.

[djakeydd]

I'm not a seaman, however, I know the precise spot where the Queen of the North wrecked, have flown over it many times. My question, are these crewmembers who were supposedly at the helm, one of whom had absolutely no clue regarding navigation, being charged with criminal negligence causing death?

[Scape]

To Be Announced

$1:

Mr. Justice Brian Joyce of B.C. Supreme Court will decide next Thursday on a key legal question arising from a quest for damages by the children of one of the two victims of the sinking of the Queen of the North.

The judge is to rule on B.C. Ferries' bid to sever the jury civil trial into two procedures, one to assess the amount of damages, the second to assess whether "recklessness" was involved in the mishap.

Lawyers representing the children of victim Gerald Foisy oppose splitting the trial. Court has heard allegations that one crew member at the helm of the ferry shortly before it crashed into Gil Island south of Prince Rupert had little knowledge of navigation and that not all water-tight doors on the vessel were closed at the time of the collision.

[Gunnair]

djakeydd djakeydd:

I'm not a seaman, however, I know the precise spot where the Queen of the North wrecked, have flown over it many times. My question, are these crewmembers who were supposedly at the helm, one of whom had absolutely no clue regarding navigation, being charged with criminal negligence causing death?

The helmsman shouldn't - unless she was specifically trained in navigation and had charge from the CO.

[djakeydd]

So is anyone gonna take the fall for this?

[ridenrain]

I think the worst thing that happened was they were fired.

[Freakinoldguy]

I don't know if this will help clear up the confusion about what happened but I thought it might be interesting reading.

$1:

The ship's captain was reportedly not on the bridge at the time of the accident. [2] Local weather reports indicated winds gusting to 75 km/h in the vicinity of Wright Sound. According to Kevin Falcon, the BC Minister of Transportation, the autopilot equipment had been certified by Transport Canada only as recently as 2 March [3].

$1:

The BC Ferries report also highlights the role of the fourth officer who had control of the ship from Sainty Point, but failed to make the necessary course correction. According to the report, The Vancouver Sun writes that:

Just before the crash, the fourth officer screamed at the helmswoman to make a bold course correction--a 109-degree turn--and to switch off the autopilot. But she [the helmswoman] "stated not knowing where the switch was located." [The] BC Ferries' report questions the validity of this evidence "as the autopilot disengages simply with a single switch and would have been operated numerous times by the [helmswoman]." However, in its own report, BC Ferries states the master found it necessary to post a note for navigational crew on how to operate the autopilot and included procedures for changing modes. Evidence was given that the woman at the wheel didn't know the location of the ship when she took over as lookout--or that the ferry was about to crash until she saw trees. She said she was asked to make only one, maybe two small course changes as directed by the fourth officer after she started her shift but that was...until just before the vessel hit Gil Island.[14]
The Vancouver Sun does cite an earlier safety board advisory which said that the bridge crew "were confused about how to use a new steering mode selector switch--that among other things controls whether the ship is on autopilot or manual steering--installed in a retrofit in February [2006]."[14] However, BC Ferries concludes the bridge crew working the night of the disaster "chose" to use newly installed steering controls in a way "different" than instructed but that this choice did not appear to have been the cause for the grounding of the Queen of the North.[14] David Hahn states that

"The ship never altered course at all. It never changed its speed, it just ran straight into Gil Island...There's nothing to indicate they [the 3 crew members] ever tried anything, It's just human error."[14]

I don't know if we'll ever get the real facts about what happened that night and you can believe which ever story you want, but the fact remains who in their right mind would ever use the autopilot in enclosed waters, especially with a wind speed of 75 knots?

[Scape]

Remember the Thor's Twins in the hunt for Red October? When you have the same course over and over you can do it in your sleep... as long as you make the turns. In this case they were too busy yakking and I suspect 4/0 was not even at his post. The QM, although not trained fully, was not the one responable here.

[herbie]

Busy yakking?

Heavy_Metal Heavy_Metal:

tisk tisk gunnair...it's called a GPS system...that's cummin out of your semens pay...

I thought this first post was a Freudian reference to what we heard was really going on on the bridge....

[Gunnair]

BartSimpson BartSimpson:

According to what I saw on the BC Ferries site all of the mates who could serve on the bridge are supposed to have basic navigation certificates. If the person at the helm was not rated to be at the helm then that is reckless endangerment on the part of BC Ferries.

Basic navigation is a necessity for a helmsman so they can understand their orders. Why someone who was not qualified was at the helm escapes me.

Reminds me of my friend Justin who was in the US Navy telling me of a Lt. who was in command of a destroyer in formation on a heading of (I'll say 350 as I don't recall the exact heading he told me) and the fleet was to come to a course of 340. A ten degree course change.

Except the eltee orders to come about to starboard to a course of 340. The helmsman asked him if he was sure about that and the Lt. blew up at him. At which point the wheel went hard over to starboard to make the near circular course change. The eltee is then screaming at the helmsman and the Master Chief tells the eltee the kid is just doing as ordered. The ship is of course heeling over with her port windows looking at a lot of green while this is going on and the wheel stays hard over while the destroyer goes across her own wake.

When the skipper finally gets to the bridge and orders the ship on the correct course he has an eltee wanting to press charges against two crew members. Pulling the tape it's found the eltee gave exactly the order that was followed.

The point here is that the helm knew it was a bad order and questioned it.

BC Ferries failed because the person at the helm of the Queen would not have known a bad order from a good one and had no business at the helm of that ship.

You're an army type, that's why it escapes you - you should stick to pepper potting.

The helmsman does not need navigation to steer - he needs to know left from right. The OOW can make a bad conning order, and the helmsmans is taught to question it if he feels it is not correct. If the OOW confirms the order, the helmsman does it - the OOW has charge from the CO, the helmsman does not.

In the BC ferries case, there was no helm order. The ship stayed on its course and did not make a turn when required - an issue of navigation that remains within the purvue of the mate not the helmsman. Therefore, the helmsman was not to blame.

Even if the helmsman didn't know GPS, autopilot controls, or how to use the bloody dimmer switch, it was a mistake in navigation - not in steering.

If BC Ferries turns out tomorrow to confirm that a helmsman is responsible for all these things, then I will glady take it back - but I'll be some amazed that any company would work that way.