The huge scale of Pakistan's complicity

There is, however, at least one genuine insight: dozens of reports tagging the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – the branch of Pakistan's military charged with most aspects of its Afghan policy – as the main driver of the conflict. So long as cross-border interference goes unchecked, prospects for peace remain dim.

As the War Logs make clear, the principal drivers of violence are no longer, if they ever were, inside Afghanistan.

Consider the following:

First, in February, Pakistan's security forces began arresting a dozen or so Taliban leaders – whose presence on their soil they had always noisily denied – presumably because these insurgent commanders had shown genuine, independent interest in reconciliation.

Second, the chief of Pakistan's army staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, this year once again successfully resisted U.S. pressure to launch military operations in Baluchistan and North Waziristan, where the Islamic Emirate is based.

Third, Gen. Kayani told Mr. Karzai this spring that the condition for peace in Afghanistan would be the closing of several Indian consulates, while offering to broker deals with Islamic Emirate leaders, whom he considers a “strategic asset.”

Fourth, Gen. Kayani blithely told a Washington audience that he remained wedded to “strategic depth” – that is, to making Afghanistan the kind of proprietary hinterland for Pakistan, free of Indian or other outside influence, which it was from 1992 to 2001.

For all the damage the WikiLeaks data dump could cause, at least they have brought our attention back to where it should be – to the real obstacles to peace.